| Maurilio Lovatti | Ethics and Reason: Richard M. Hare and Hume's Law | |
| Meta-ethics | Ethics | |
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A synthetic glance about the basic outlines of Hare's Meta-ethics is offered in this paper to support the idea that Hume's law is still a productive resource for ethical studies.
Hare accepted the emotivist premise that moral judgments do not, in the same way as ordinary statements do, state matters of fact that are either true or false, but denied that therefore they must be forms of exclamation. The essential character of moral discourse consisted, not, as the emotivists had held, in its links with subjective attitudes, but with action; moral judgments were prescriptive, in that they expressed commitments to action on the part of the person uttering them, and at the same time their rationality was assured by their universalisability, i.e. their property of applying not merely to the person uttering them, but to all similar persons in similar circumstances.
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| Maurilio Lovatti | General Ideas and the Knowability of Essence: Interpretations of Locke's Theory of Knowledge | |
| Epistemology | Early Modern Philosophy | |
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Widespread amongst scholars is the legend according to which Locke shows a strong aversion to abstract ideas, similar to that of Berkley in the Treatise. This legend is endorsed by influential commentators on Locke. He does not even propose the reduction of ideas to mental pictures (a reduction which in Berkeley and Hume will form the base of the negation of the existence of abstract ideas in the mind).
Locke is not in the least afraid of abstract ideas; his constant concern, which is evident in his treatment of the complex question of the relation between real and nominal essence, is to refute the position of the Scholastics, according to which a universal concept in the mind (post rem) reflects the universal present in all things as substantial form (the universal in re), without assuming positions which are purely conventionalist and nominalist with regard to knowledge, such as those of Mersenne, Gassendi, Hobbes and sceptical and anti-Cartesian free-thinkers.
To show this, I offer an analysis of the relation Locke makes between real and nominal essence, with regard to the relations which link term to idea and idea to things. The nature of the relation between signifier and signified is variable, though, in the relation between ideas and things with respect to the various kinds of complex ideas which the human mind may frame. The greatest difference is to be found between complex ideas of mixed mode and complex ideas of substance
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| Maurilio Lovatti | Meta-Ethics and Analysis of Language from Wittgenstein to Deontic Logic Systems | |
| Meta-ethics | Philosophy of Language | |
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In this paper, partly historical and partly theoretical, after having shortly outlined the development of the meta-ethics in the 1900?s starting from the Tractatus of Wittgenstein, I argue it is possible to sustain that emotivism and intuitionism are unsatisfactory ethical conceptions, while on the contrary, reason (intended in a logical-deductive sense) plays an effective role both in ethical discussions and in choices. There are some characteristics of the ethical language (prescriptivity, universalizability and predominance) that cannot be eluded (pain the non significativity of the same language) by those who want to morally reason, i.e. by those who intend to regulate their own behaviour on the basis of knowledged and coherent principles. These characteristics can be found whether or not all possible ontological-metaphysics foundations of morals are taken into account. Furthermore the deontic logic systems allow the formalization of ethical theories and - at least in principle - a rigorous critical discussion of the same, but obviously nothing can be affirmed on the value of truth of the axioms of a system. In the deontic logic systems Hume?s law is assumed as an implicit result of inferential (conventional) rules and the acceptance of Hume?s law as a logical-linguistic thesis does not involve the cancellation of values (nihilism) or ethical relativism or indifferentism
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| Maurilio Lovatti | Neopositivists' Crusade Against Karl Popper | |
| Philosophy of Science | Epistemology | |
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Neopositivistic philosophers held that Popper's destructive criticism to inductive methods is wrong.
The legend according to which Popper's criticism, in the final analysis, is inconsistent is greatly widespread also amongst neopositivistic Italian scholars. I argue that they are wrong, and that, in general, Popper's view about induction is true.
According to Popper all scientific concepts are theoretical, for every assertion not only entails hypotheses but it is also hypothetical, that is not sure and always falsifiable. I argue that the validity and the strength of Popper's criticism to induction is independent from the view according to which all scientific concepts are theoretical.
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| Maurilio Lovatti | Pathology and Normality from XIX Century Positivism to the Contemporary Philosophy of Science: an Analysis of the Concept of Disease | |
| Philosophy of Biology | Continental Philosophy | |
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The idea of disease as an objective malfunctioning cannot be accepted for many different reasons. “Malfunctioning” or “failure” have a meaning only if the perfect working condition or normality is univocally determined. The differences between a person and any other person are not unimportant and cannot be ignored neither in diagnosis nor in treatment. These differences can be ascribable to three different sets of reasons: 1.illnesses leave irreversible marks on the organic structure, for they modify the information an organism has at least as far as the neuroendocrine and immune systems are involved; 2.there are individual differences in the immune system; 3.there are individual differences in the functional organization of the brain that are not due only to biological causes. Furthermore the subjective perception of the illness itself must be included among the elements that determine the features of an illness. Notwithstanding the presence of the same symptoms and the same tests readings, two people may perceive their illness in a different way, with effects on the course of the illness itself and the effectiveness of the treatment. The idea of disease also depends on the cultural context.
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| Maurilio Lovatti | Peter A. Railton and the Objective Moral Realism | |
| Meta-ethics | Ethics | |
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Peter Railton argues for a form of moral realism which holds that moral judgments can bear truth values in a fundamental non-epistemic sense of truth; that moral properties are objective, though relational; that moral properties supervene upon natural properties, and may be reducible to them; that moral inquiry is of a piece with empirical inquiry. He also thinks that it cannot be known a priori whether bivalence holds for moral judgments, and that a rational agent may fail to have a reason for obeying moral imperatives, although they may be applicable to him.
In this paper, Railton's moral theories are carefully examined and compared with noncognitivistic ones.
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| Maurilio Lovatti | Pragmatism and the Definition of the Idea of Disease | |
| American Pragmatism | Philosophy of Biology | |
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The purpose of this paper is to support the idea that pragmatism is still a productive resource for the study of health and disease.
Combining the results of thermodynamic theories with evolutionism, some said that the biological structures selected by evolution are perfect to maximize the conservation of energy; as a consequence, they tend to reduce the entropy in the organism. Thus, a process can be defined as pathological if it increases the entropy, which means a diminished efficiency of the organism. .The point of view of pragmatism is useful to disprove the thesis of those who define disease only in relation to a reduced efficiency of the organism.
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| Maurilio Lovatti | The Mental and the Normative: a Non-psychological Account | |
| Meta-ethics | Philosophy of Mind | |
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(draft; call for comments) The normative judgements are grounded in intrinsic features of believing or intending and surely they are an irremovable element in constitutive aims of believing or intending. Many philosophers have claimed that the intentional is normative (this claim is the analogue, within the philosophy of mind, of the claim that is often made within the philosophy of language, that meaning is normative). The normative judgements are grounded in intrinsic features of the intentional states of the human mind. Our intentional states are always correlated with our dispositions; when I refer to our ?dispositions? here, I do not mean to focus exclusively on our behavioural dispositions; I mean to include our mental dispositions as well, such as our dispositions to revise our beliefs and intentions in response to various conditions. We can hold that the normative nature of our judgement is intrinsic with our rational dispositions: the rational dispositions of our mind have essential normative properties, even if we must not identify mental properties with their normative role in mental activity.In this contest I deal with the concepts of factual ultimate aim and normative ultimate aim.
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