<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!-- generator="FeedCreator 1.7.2" -->
<rss version="2.0">
    <channel>
        <title>Phonline Updates</title>
        <description><![CDATA[Updates from Phonline: Online Papers in Philosophy]]></description>
        <link>http://phonline.org/</link>
        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 05 Feb 2012 18:57:54 +0100</lastBuildDate>
        <generator>FeedCreator 1.7.2</generator>
        <item>
            <title>Alberto Vanzo, &quot;Sull'interpretazione coerentista della concezione kantiana della verità&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1055</link>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper argues that Kant, in his Critical period, did not have a coherence theory of truth. The paper outlines three coherence theories of truth and two coherence theories of empirical truth that Kant might have adopted. The three theories of truth are incompatible with Kant’s texts. The two theories of empirical truth are compatible with the texts. However, there are no convincing reasons to hold that Kant adopted those theories.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=AlbertoVanzo&quot;&gt;Alberto Vanzo&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Alberto Vanzo, &quot;Kant, Skepticism, and the Comparison Argument&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1054</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Kant's writings on logic illustrate the comparison argument about truth, which goes as follows. A truth-bearer p is true if and only if it corresponds, or it agrees, with a portion of reality: the object(s), state(s) of affairs, or event(s) p is about. In order to know whether p agrees with that portion of reality, one must check if that portion of reality is as p states. Using the terms of the comparison argument, one must compare p with that portion of reality. This is impossible, because the only knowledge of reality we can have is in the form propositions, beliefs, or judgments, whose agreement with reality is as much in need of justification as the agreement of p with reality. Therefore, it is impossible to know which truth-bearers are true.

In this paper, I reconstruct Kant's version of the comparison argument. I argue that, for Kant, the argument is sound only under the assumption of transcendental realism. Transcendental idealism avoids the sceptical consequences of the comparison argument.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=AlbertoVanzo&quot;&gt;Alberto Vanzo&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Ralph Wedgwood, &quot;Instrumental Rationality&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1053</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Is there any distinctive aspect of rationality that deserves the label of “instrumental rationality”? Recently, Joseph Raz (2005) has argued that instrumental rationality is a “myth”. In this essay, I shall give some qualified support to Raz’s position: as I shall argue, many philosophers have indeed been seduced by certain myths about instrumental rationality. Nonetheless, Raz’s conclusion is too strong. Instrumental rationality is not itself a myth: there really is a distinctive aspect of rationality that deserves the label of “instrumental rationality”.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=wedgwood&quot;&gt;Ralph Wedgwood&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Ralph Wedgwood, &quot;Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1052</link>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper articulates a conception of reasons for action according to which all reasons for action are grounded in the relationship between the courses of action that are available to the agent at the relevant time and what are here called the "<i>intrinsic values</i>". Even though these intrinsic values are conceived of in a way that makes them very similar to how they are thought of by consequentialist moral theorists, this conception of reasons for action is designed to leave room for an aggressively anti-consequentialist view, according to which we have no reasons to "promote" these intrinsic values (at least in the consequentialists' sense of "promoting").]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=wedgwood&quot;&gt;Ralph Wedgwood&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Ralph Wedgwood, &quot;The &quot;Good&quot; and the &quot;Right&quot; Revisited&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1051</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Moral philosophy has long been preoccupied by a supposed dichotomy between the "good" and the "right". This dichotomy has been taken to define certain allegedly central issues for ethics. How are the good and the right related to each other? For example, is one of the two (as many philosophers have put it) "prior" to the other? If so, is the good prior to the right, or is the right prior to the good?]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=wedgwood&quot;&gt;Ralph Wedgwood&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Richard Heck, &quot;Frege Arithmetic and &quot;Everyday Mathematics&quot;&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1050</link>
            <description><![CDATA[The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that predicative Frege arithmetic naturally interprets some weak but non-trivial arithmetical theories. The weak theories in question are all related to Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson's R. In saying that the interpretation is "natural", I mean that it relies only upon "definitions" of arithmetical notions that are themselves "natural", that is, that have some claim to be "definitions" in something other than a purely formal sense.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=rgheck&quot;&gt;Richard Heck&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Ingo Brigandt, &quot;Philosophy of biology&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1049</link>
            <description></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=brigandt&quot;&gt;Ingo Brigandt&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Ingo Brigandt, &quot;Natural kinds and concepts: a pragmatist and methodologically naturalistic ...</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1048</link>
            <description><![CDATA[In this chapter I lay out a notion of philosophical naturalism that aligns with pragmatism. It is developed and illustrated by a presentation of my views on natural kinds and my theory of concepts. Both accounts reflect a methodological naturalism and are defended not based on metaphysical considerations, but in terms of their philosophical fruitfulness. A core theme is that the epistemic interests of scientists have to be taken into account by any naturalistic philosophy of science in general, and any account of natural kinds and scientific concepts in particular. I conclude with general methodological remarks on how to develop and defend philosophical notions without using intuitions.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=brigandt&quot;&gt;Ingo Brigandt&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Richard Heck, Robert May, &quot;Truth In Frege&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1047</link>
            <description><![CDATA[A general survey of Frege's views on truth, the paper explores the problems in response to which Frege's distinctive view that sentences refer to truth-values develops. It also discusses his view that truth-values are objects and the so-called regress argument for the indefinability of truth. Finally, we consider, very briefly, the question whether Frege was a deflationist.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=rgheck&quot;&gt;Richard Heck&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=rmay&quot;&gt;Robert May&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Richard Heck, George Boolos, &quot;Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik §§82-83&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1046</link>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper contains a close analysis of Frege's proofs of the axioms of arithmetic  §§70-83 of <i>Die Grundlagen</i>, with special attention to the proof of the existence of successors in  §§82-83. Reluctantly and hesitantly, we come to the conclusion that Frege was at least somewhat confused in those two sections and that he cannot be said to have outlined, or even to have intended, any correct proof there. The proof he sketches is in many ways similar to that given in <i>Grundgesetze der Arithmetik</i>, but fidelity to what Frege wrote in <i>Die Grundlagen</i> and in <i>Grundgesetze</i> requires us to reject the charitable suggestion that it was this (beautiful) proof that he had in mind in  §§82-83.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=rgheck&quot;&gt;Richard Heck&lt;/a&gt;, George Boolos</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Ingo Brigandt, &quot;Accounting for Vertebrate Limbs: From Owen’s Homology to Novelty in ...</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1043</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Review essay of Richard Owen's On the Nature of Limbs: A Discourse edited by Ron Amundson, University of Chicago Press, 2007.  This article reviews the recent reissuing of Richard Owen’s On the Nature of Limbs and its three novel, introductory essays. These essays make Owen’s 1849 text very accessible by discussing the historical context of his work and explaining how Owen’s ideas relate to his larger intellectual framework. In addition to the ways in which the essays point to Owen’s relevance for contemporary biology, I discuss how Owen’s unity of type theory and his homology claims about fins and limbs compare with modern views. While the phenomena studied by Owen are nowadays of major interest to evolutionary developmental biology, research in evo-devo has largely shifted from homology (which was Owen’s concern) towards evolutionary novelty, e.g., accounting for fins as a novelty. Still, I argue that questions about homology are important and raise challenges even for explanations of novelty.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=brigandt&quot;&gt;Ingo Brigandt&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Richard Heck, &quot;The Existence (and Non-existence) of Abstract Objects&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1042</link>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper is concerned with neo-Fregean accounts of reference to abstract objects. It develops an objection to the most familiar such accounts, due to Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, based upon what I call the 'proliferation problem': Hale and Wright's account makes reference to abstract objects seem too easy, as is shown by the fact that any equivalence relation seems as good as any other. The paper then develops a response to this objection, and offers an account of what it is for abstracta to exist that is Fregean in spirit but more robust than familiar views.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=rgheck&quot;&gt;Richard Heck&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Carlo Cellucci, &quot;Knowledge and the Meaning of Human Life&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1041</link>
            <description><![CDATA[In this paper I discuss the view, put forward by several people from Aristotle to
Russell, that knowledge is the ultimate purpose and meaning of human life, and I find it
wanting. I also argue that all attempts to show that human life has a meaning from an external
and higher point of view have been unsuccessful, human life having a meaning only from an
internal point of view. I discuss such meaning and argue that, while knowledge is not the
ultimate purpose and meaning of human life, it is a precondition of its meaning from an
internal point of view.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=cellucci&quot;&gt;Carlo Cellucci&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Ingo Brigandt, &quot;Scientific Reasoning Is Material Inference: Combining Confirmation, ...</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1039</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Whereas an inference (deductive as well as inductive) is usually viewed as being valid in virtue of its argument form, the present paper argues that scientific reasoning is material inference, i.e., justified in virtue of its content. A material inference is licensed by the empirical content embodied in the concepts contained in the premisses and conclusion. Understanding scientific reasoning as material inference has the advantage of combining different aspects of scientific reasoning, such as confirmation, discovery, and explanation. This approach explains why these different aspects (including discovery) can be rational without conforming to formal schemes, and why scientific reasoning is local, i.e., justified only in certain domains and contingent on particular empirical facts. The notion of material inference also fruitfully interacts with accounts of conceptual change and psychological theories of concepts.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=brigandt&quot;&gt;Ingo Brigandt&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Carlo Cellucci, &quot;The Heuristic View, and the Limitations of Analytic Philosophy&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1038</link>
            <description><![CDATA[English translation of Chapter 1 of the book "Why Still Philosophy" where the limitations of analytic philosophy are discussed and an alternative view of philosophy - the 'Heuristic View' - is outlined.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=cellucci&quot;&gt;Carlo Cellucci&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Ingo Brigandt, &quot;The Epistemic Goal of a Concept: Accounting for the Rationality of ...</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1037</link>
            <description><![CDATA[The discussion presents a framework of concepts that is intended to account for the rationality of semantic change and variation, suggesting that each scientific concept consists of three components of content: 1) reference, 2) inferential role, and 3) the epistemic goal pursued with the concept’s use. I argue that in the course of history a concept can change in any of these components, and that change in the concept’s inferential role and reference can be accounted for as being rational relative to the third component, the concept’s epistemic goal. This framework is illustrated and defended by application to the history of the gene concept. It is explained how the molecular gene concept grew rationally out of the classical gene concept despite a change in reference, and why the use and reference of the contemporary molecular gene concept may legitimately vary from context to context.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=brigandt&quot;&gt;Ingo Brigandt&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Ingo Brigandt, Robert A. Wilson, Matthew J. ...</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1036</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Essentialism is widely regarded as a mistaken view of biological kinds, such as species.  After recounting why (sections 2-3), we provide a brief survey of the chief responses to the “death of essentialism” in the philosophy of biology (section 4).  We then develop one of these responses, the claim that biological kinds are homeostatic property clusters (sections 5-6) illustrating this view with several novel examples (section 7).  Although this view was first expressed 20 years ago, and has received recent discussion and critique, it remains under-developed and is often misrepresented by its critics (section 8).]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=brigandt&quot;&gt;Ingo Brigandt&lt;/a&gt;, Robert A. Wilson, Matthew J. Barker</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Ingo Brigandt, Leandro Assis, &quot;Homology: Homeostatic Property Cluster Kinds in Systematics ...</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1035</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Taxa and homologues can in our view be construed both as kinds and as individuals. However, the conceptualization of taxa as natural kinds in the sense of homeostatic property cluster kinds has been criticized by some systematists, as it seems that even such kinds cannot evolve due to their being homeostatic. We reply by arguing that the treatment of transformational and taxic homologies, respectively, as dynamic and static aspects of the same homeostatic property cluster kind represents a good perspective for supporting the conceptualization of taxa as kinds. The focus on a phenomenon of homology based on causal processes (e.g., connectivity, activity-function, genetics, inheritance, and modularity) and implying relationship with modification yields a notion of natural kinds conforming to the phylogenetic-evolutionary framework. Nevertheless, homeostatic property cluster kinds in taxonomic and evolutionary practice must be rooted in the primacy of epistemological classification (homology as observational properties) over metaphysical generalization (series of transformation and common ancestry as unobservational processes). The perspective of individuating characters exclusively by historical-transformational independence instead of their developmental, structural, and functional independence fails to yield a sufficient practical interplay between theory and observation. Purely ontological and ostensional perspectives in evolution and phylogeny (e.g., an ideographic character concept and PhyloCode’s ‘individualism’ of clades) may be pragmatically contested in the case of urgent issues in biodiversity research, conservation, and systematics.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=brigandt&quot;&gt;Ingo Brigandt&lt;/a&gt;, Leandro Assis</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Ralph Wedgwood, &quot;A Priori Bootstrapping&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1034</link>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper seeks to explain how we can be <i>a priori</i> justified in believing that we are not in a "sceptical scenario" (e.g. that we are not currently being deceived by the machinations of an evil demon). The upshot is that explaining our justification for this <i>belief</i> is less fundamental than explaining our justification for our fundamental <i>belief-forming practices</i> -- including (most notably) the practice that is here called "taking one's experience at face value". If this is indeed a "primitively rational" belief-forming practice, then it is not hard to explain why (in the absence of defeating evidence of various kinds) we are also <i>a priori</i> justified in believing it to be reliable.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=wedgwood&quot;&gt;Ralph Wedgwood&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Ralph Wedgwood, &quot;Review of Kieran Setiya, Reasons without Rationalism&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1033</link>
            <description><![CDATA[This is a review of Kieran Setiya's book <i>Reasons without Rationalism</i> (Princeton University Press, 2007).]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=wedgwood&quot;&gt;Ralph Wedgwood&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Ralph Wedgwood, &quot;Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Processes&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1032</link>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper proposes an answer to one of the most profound and difficult questions of epistemology: What can make a belief-forming process rational if its rationality is <i>not</i> due to the availability of some <i>independent</i> justification for believing that the belief-forming practice is reliable?]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=wedgwood&quot;&gt;Ralph Wedgwood&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Carlo Cellucci, &quot;Introduction to 'Why Still Philosophy'&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1029</link>
            <description><![CDATA[English translation of the Introduction of the book 'Why Still Philosophy'. It gives an answer to the question if there is still any point to philosophy. Then, on the basis of such answer, it deals with the question of the role of knowledge in nature, and specifically, of its role in human life and in the life of all organisms. To answer this question it develops a new approach to naturalized epistemology.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=cellucci&quot;&gt;Carlo Cellucci&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Benjamin Schnieder, &quot;Inexpressible Properties and Grelling’s Antinomy&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1028</link>
            <description><![CDATA[The paper discusses whether there are strictly inexpressible properties. Three main points are argued for: (i) Two different senses of ‘predicate t expresses property p’ should be distinguished. (ii) The property of being a predicate that does not apply to itself is inexpressible in one of the senses of ‘express’, but not in the other. (iii) Since the said property is related to Grelling’s Antinomy, it is further argued that the antinomy does not imply the non-existence of that property.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=Stieder&quot;&gt;Benjamin Schnieder&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Benjamin Schnieder, &quot;‘By’ - A Refutation of the Anscombe Thesis&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1027</link>
            <description><![CDATA[The paper has two main objectives: first, it presents a new argument against the so-called Anscombe Thesis (if x φ-s by ψ-ing, then x’s φ-ing = x’s ψ-ing). Second, it develops a proposal about the syntax and semantics of the ‘by’-locution.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=Stieder&quot;&gt;Benjamin Schnieder&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Pamela Hieronymi, &quot;The Reasons of Trust&quot;</title>
            <link>http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=1023</link>
            <description><![CDATA[Trust is required for any collective enterprise; a psychologically healthy person must be capable of trusting others; trusting relationships are a vital component of a fulfilling life. Trust may also be recommended as a way to build greater trust in a particular relationship, a way to build the self-esteem of the one trusted, or as a way to avoid hurting someone's feelings. It may be required by one's role as friend, teacher, or parent. Trust is, in each of these ways, useful, valuable, important, or required. Yet I argue that, although each of these considerations genuinely counts in favor of trusting—and so, in some way, succeeds as a reason for trust—they cannot be taken up as one's reasons for trusting someone to do something. To whatever degree these are one's reasons for doing what one does, to that degree one is not trusting.]]></description>
            <author>&lt;a href=&quot;author.php?keyauth=Hieronymi&quot;&gt;Pamela Hieronymi&lt;/a&gt;</author>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>

